I. Introduction: Why We Cannot See What We See
There is a paradox at the heart of the modern information space: never in history has humanity had access to such a volume of data on current events — and never has the analysis of those events been so systematically distorted. Not by censorship in its classical Soviet or Nazi sense — crude, obvious, leaving white spaces on newspaper pages. But by something far more sophisticated: narrative framing — a system of interpretation that does not hide facts but embeds them in a pre-built semantic construct, making alternative readings psychologically uncomfortable or socially stigmatized.
When a Western analyst says "Russian aggression," he is not lying about the fact of military action. He is lying about its context, its prehistory, and its system of cause and effect. When a Russian state commentator says "denazification" and "protection of Russian-speaking populations," he is not inventing a problem from thin air either. He is embedding a real problem into a narrative that serves specific political interests.
A thinking person — and it is precisely to such a person that this article is addressed — is not obliged to choose between these two interpretive systems. He is obliged to apply the same analytical standard to both. That is exactly what we will attempt to do in the pages that follow.
The question we are asking is entirely concrete: do real prerequisites for the outbreak of a third world war exist today? And if so — who is the genuine subject, and who is the object?
Before reading further — stop for a moment. Think of the last three news items you read today. From which source? What frame did they use — explicitly or implicitly? This is not a rhetorical question. It is the first step of the very analysis this article advocates.
II. Methodology: How to Analyze Without a Narrative
Before moving to facts, the method must be established. Analysis without a narrative does not mean analysis without a position — that would be intellectual cowardice disguised as objectivity. It means the following:
Principle one: equal standard. Any action that we qualify as aggression, violation of international law, or a war crime with respect to one subject must receive the same qualification with respect to any other subject under analogous circumstances. No exceptions for "our side."
Principle two: the cui bono question. For every significant event, one must ask: who benefited? Not who declared what goals — but who actually won. History shows that declared goals and actual beneficiaries coincide far less often than is commonly assumed.
Principle three: distinguishing the legitimacy of concerns from the lawfulness of actions. A state may have entirely legitimate security concerns — and yet choose instruments to resolve them that destroy that very security. These two judgments do not contradict each other.
Principle four: historical parallelism without analogy. History does not repeat literally — but structural mechanisms recur. The purpose of historical comparison is not to equate Putin with Hitler or Biden with Churchill — but to identify repeating patterns of decision-making under conditions of mounting systemic crisis.
With these tools — let us begin.
Take any news item from your usual feed and apply these four principles to it right now. Who benefited? Is the same standard applied to "our side"? Is the legitimacy of concerns distinguished from the lawfulness of actions? Most likely you will find the answer is no. That is normal — but it is useful to know about yourself.
III. Map of Active Conflicts: What Is Actually Happening
The years 2024–2026 have recorded the highest number of simultaneously active armed conflicts in all of post-war history. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala University, in 2024 the world counted 59 active armed conflicts in 34 countries — the highest figure since 1946. Global military spending reached 2.5% of global GDP.
But quantity is only the first level of analysis. What matters more is the quality and configuration of the conflicts.
Ukraine: The First Proxy War in History Between Nuclear Powers in Direct Fire Contact
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is unprecedented in one specific respect: for the first time since the Korean War of 1950–1953, we observe a situation in which the military equipment, intelligence data, satellite targeting, and financing of one party to a conflict are provided by a nuclear power that is in acute strategic confrontation with another nuclear power. The difference from Korea is fundamental: at that time the US and USSR did not have nuclear parity. Today they do.
This means that any escalation of the conflict — accidental or deliberate — occurs under conditions in which nuclear deterrence theory is, for the first time, undergoing a real rather than theoretical test.
The Middle East: A Regional War With Global Participants
The conflict in Gaza, which began in October 2023, had by 2025–2026 transformed into a multilevel regional confrontation involving Israel, Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and pro-Iranian formations in Iraq and Syria. The United States conducted direct military strikes on the territory of Yemen and Iran. Iran responded with strikes on Israel.
Applying the equal standard principle: US strikes on the sovereign territory of Yemen without a UN Security Council mandate are legally indistinguishable from actions that in other contexts are qualified as aggression. This is not a value judgment — it is the application of one and the same legal standard.
Taiwan: The Silent Timer
The least discussed in public discourse — and potentially the most dangerous — theater. China is systematically building military capacity for a possible forcible reunification operation with Taiwan. American military analysts, including former Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Phil Davidson, have cited 2027 as a possible window for such an operation. This does not mean it will happen — but it means the third major global conflict node is in an active phase of preparation.
How many of these 59 conflicts did you know about before reading this article? Two? Five? Ten? What you knew is determined not by the scale of the conflict but by its presence in your information space. This is narrative control in action: not lies, but a choice about what to talk about.
IV. 1938: Why the Analogy Works Where It Is Not Usually Applied
Comparison with 1938 has become a commonplace of Western discourse with respect to Russia and Putin. This comparison simultaneously contains a grain of truth and constitutes crude analytical abuse.
The grain of truth: the structural pattern — a great power appealing to the protection of "its own" abroad, systematically testing the international community's readiness to resist, and interpreting each concession as permission for the next step — is genuinely present.
The analytical abuse: the comparison is applied one-sidedly and ignores the key question — what was happening before 1938?
The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 was deliberately humiliating and economically suffocating. This does not justify Hitler — but it explains why the German population was psychologically primed for radical revanchism. To ignore Versailles when analyzing 1938 is to analyze the symptom while ignoring the disease.
Applying the same principle to today: NATO's expansion eastward in defiance of the verbal assurances of 1990, the recognition of Kosovo bypassing the UN Security Council, the support for the change of power in Kyiv in 2014 — none of this justifies subsequent Russian actions. But ignoring these factors in analysis is to reproduce the same analytical error made by Western historians who began their analysis of the Second World War from 1939.
There is also another, less obvious historical parallel. In 1938 the Polish government had access to intelligence about Germany's plans regarding Poland. Nevertheless Poland did not strike preemptively — for a number of reasons: lack of international support, the risk of being qualified as the aggressor, uncertainty about its own military capabilities. The result is well known.
The question this historical fact poses for us today is extremely uncomfortable: does a state have the right to preemptive action if it possesses sufficient evidence of impending aggression? International law answers this question in the negative — and precisely this makes it an instrument for protecting the status quo rather than an instrument of justice.
Now a question directly to you: which version of the 1938 analogy were you using before reading this section? The full one — with Versailles and the prehistory? Or the truncated one — the one that begins at whichever date is convenient for your position? The answer will tell you a great deal about which narrative shaped you.
V. The Deterrence Mechanism: Why It Is Broken
The post-war system for preventing global conflict rested on four pillars:
Pillar one: the UN and the Security Council. The idea was that the great powers holding veto rights would be compelled to negotiate. In practice, the veto transformed the Security Council into a body incapable of making binding decisions precisely when most needed — that is, at the moment of conflict between permanent members.
Pillar two: the arms control treaty system. By 2026, virtually nothing remained of it. The United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. Russia suspended the New START Treaty in 2023. The Open Skies Treaty is dead. The Vienna Document on confidence-building measures is functionally inoperative.
Pillar three: direct communication channels between leaders. In 1962, it was precisely the direct correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev that made it possible to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today, no comparable functioning channels exist between Moscow and Washington.
Pillar four: economic interdependence as a deterrent. The theory held: countries deeply integrated economically will not go to war, because war would destroy their own prosperity. This theory failed in 1914 — Germany and Britain were each other's largest trading partners on the eve of the war. The sanctions wars of 2022–2026 demonstrate that economic interdependence can be dismantled faster than is generally assumed.
All four pillars are either destroyed or seriously damaged. This is not in itself a catastrophe — but it means that accidental escalation today has no institutional braking mechanisms of the kind that existed even at the sharpest moments of the Cold War.
You probably knew about one or two of these broken pillars. Did you know about all four simultaneously? And if not — why did precisely this information fail to enter your field of vision? This is not accidental. It too is the result of a choice — someone's choice about what counts as important news.
VI. Cui Bono: Who Profits From a Managed Conflict
This is the most politically sensitive part of the analysis — and precisely for that reason, the most important.
Let us apply the cui bono principle consistently and without exceptions.
The American Military-Industrial Complex
By 2025, the war in Ukraine had secured American defense companies — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics — contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars. This is not conspiracy theory — it is public financial reporting. The shares of these companies rose in direct correlation with the escalation of the conflict. President Eisenhower warned of the danger of the military-industrial complex as far back as 1961 — his warning is more relevant today than ever.
The American LNG Sector
The severing of energy ties between Europe and Russia — a direct consequence of the conflict — created a colossal new market for American liquefied natural gas. Europe, which had previously received cheap pipeline gas from Russia, was forced to reorient toward significantly more expensive American LNG. The beneficiaries of this process are known and public.
Financial Institutions Managing Frozen Assets
Approximately $300 billion in Russian state assets have been frozen by Western jurisdictions. The discussion about their confiscation or transfer to Ukraine continues. In any case these assets are under the management of Western financial institutions — and this management generates concrete income.
Let us emphasize what is essential: the enumeration of these facts does not mean that the war was planned in a single room by a group of conspirators. Conspiratorial thinking is the same analytical error as naive trust in official narratives. What is at issue is a different mechanism — the system rewards certain actions, and rational actors within that system perform those actions without needing coordination or a common plan. Adam Smith described this mechanism as applied to markets. It functions in exactly the same way as applied to the market for war.
Now apply that same question to your own information source. Whose shares rise when your newspaper or television channel ratchets up tension? Who finances the think tank whose experts regularly appear in your broadcasts? This does not mean they are lying. It means their interests are part of an equation you are obliged to factor in.
VII. Russia: Subject, Object, or Both?
The Western narrative portrays Russia as an unambiguous subject — an aggressor acting by its own will in its own interests. The Russian narrative portrays Russia as a victim — a state forced to defend itself against an existential threat from the West. Both narratives contain elements of truth and both are incomplete.
The real picture requires accounting for structural factors.
After 1991, the Russian economy was embedded in the Western financial system in a way that created systemic dependence. The offshoring of the Russian elite — holding assets, educating children, owning property in Western jurisdictions — created a class of people with Russian passports and Western interests. This is not Soviet propaganda — it is a structural fact that the Western sanctions of 2022 made suddenly obvious to everyone.
This means that Russia of the 1990s–2010s functioned in a mode of partial sovereignty: a formally independent state whose elites were embedded in another's system of interests. Any sovereign action immediately activated the mechanism of that embeddedness.
At the same time — and this is essential — this concept does not remove responsibility from specific Russian leaders. Over 25 years in power it was possible to build an independent financial architecture, prevent the offshoring of elites, create technological sovereignty. Some of this was done — late and partially. The greater part was missed in the 2000s, when oil revenues provided every opportunity for it.
The question of whether this missed opportunity resulted from external management, internal corruption, or systemic incompetence remains open. And precisely for this reason it is the key analytical question. Any system that offers a closed answer to it is no longer analysis.
The concept of partial sovereignty described here with respect to Russia is universal. Does it apply to your own country? To its elites? Where are their assets held? Where do their children study? This is an uncomfortable question for any citizen of any country. Precisely for that reason it is worth asking.
VIII. Ukraine: Subject or Instrument?
The Ukrainian narrative insists on the absolute sovereignty of the Ukrainian people and their right to self-determination. The Russian narrative insists that Ukraine is an "anti-Russia" — a project artificially constructed against Russia. Both narratives contain elements of truth and both are incomplete.
Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as a people possess a real identity, a real history, and real interests. This is indisputable. Equally indisputable is another fact: since 2014, Ukraine has been the object of large-scale external influence — Western in character — that has included the financing of political parties, NGOs, media, educational programs, military training, and armament.
This is not a unique situation — the USSR did the same within its sphere of influence. But acknowledging this fact is necessary for analytical completeness.
The key question is this: whose interests lie in the continuation of the conflict? The answer is painful for Ukrainian elites, because it implies: the country whose population is bearing the maximum losses in lives and the maximum destruction of infrastructure may not be the principal beneficiary of its own war. This does not mean Ukrainians are fighting "in vain" or that their sacrifices are meaningless — they are fighting for real values. It means the system within which they are fighting serves interests that extend far beyond Ukraine's borders.
If you are Ukrainian — this section probably provoked resistance. If you are not Ukrainian — it probably seemed self-evident. Notice this asymmetry in your own reaction. It is itself data about how narrative works — and how deeply it is embedded in you.
IX. The Nuclear Factor: Why Deterrence Is Not Guaranteed
Nuclear deterrence is based on the MAD theory — Mutual Assured Destruction. The logic is simple: since a nuclear exchange means the destruction of both sides, a rational actor will never initiate one.
This theory functions under two conditions:
Condition one: all actors are rational in the sense of maximizing their own survival as the highest priority. History shows that this condition is not universal. An actor convinced of its own righteousness, of the existential character of a threat, or of the religious-ideological justification for sacrifice, may make decisions that violate the logic of MAD.
Condition two: accidental escalation is absent. This condition was violated many times even during the Cold War — the incidents of 1983, when the Soviet early-warning system registered a false signal of a US missile strike, show how close the world came to catastrophe for purely technical reasons.
Today both conditions are under pressure. The degradation of communication channels increases the risk of accidental escalation. The mounting domestic political pressure on leaders from multiple directions creates incentives for risky signaling actions.
When did you last think about this personally — not as abstract geopolitics, but as a real risk to you, your family, your city? If the answer is "long ago" or "never" — that too is the result of a system that turns nuclear threat into background noise so as not to paralyze society. This is understandable. But being aware of it — is useful.
X. Information Warfare as a New Theater of Operations
The third world war, if it is happening or approaching, is unfolding not only on battlefields. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, influence operations on social media, the destabilization of political systems through support for radical movements — all of this constitutes elements of a conflict that carries no formal declaration of war and is not captured by traditional military metrics.
It is essential to note: in this theater all major actors are simultaneously attackers and attacked. The United States conducts influence operations. Russia conducts influence operations. China conducts influence operations. Applying the equal standard principle: this is either a war everyone is waging, or a sovereign right everyone possesses. To call some actors aggressors in the information space while turning a blind eye to one's own operations is to apply a double standard.
This has a practical implication for the reader of this article: any media content you consume — including this article — is part of an information environment that is also shaped by deliberate influence operations. The only defense is the habit of applying the equal standard and asking cui bono.
You are a participant in this war. Whether you wanted to be or not. Every time you share a news item, comment on a post, or form an opinion based on what you have read — you are a node in an information network that all major actors are trying to use. The question is not whether to participate. The question is — consciously or not.
XI. Why "Closed Answers" Are Dangerous
Perhaps the most important observation of this analysis is the following: systems that produce closed answers to open questions functionally serve escalation.
When the Western ordinary citizen is convinced that the conflict was caused exclusively by Russian aggression and admits no other explanation — he supports the continuation of the conflict. When the Russian ordinary citizen is convinced that the conflict was caused exclusively by a Western conspiracy and Russia is a pure victim — he too supports the continuation of the conflict. Both propaganda systems work toward the same result — the elimination of public demand for de-escalation and negotiation.
This is not a coincidental convergence. A managed conflict requires managed public opinion on both sides. Hatred is the most effective instrument of such management. This is why the information space on both sides systematically produces narratives that feed hatred, and suppresses narratives that open space for understanding the other side.
The thinking person — to whom this article is addressed — is not obliged to hate. He is obliged to understand.
What closed answer are you carrying? "Putin is the new Hitler"? "The West is always guilty"? "Ukraine is a victim"? "Ukraine is a project"? Find yours. Everyone has one. Its existence is not a fault. Its unconsciousness is a vulnerability exploited by those who profit from a managed conflict.
XII. Conclusion: What Equal Logic Tells Us
The result of applying an equal analytical standard to all the factors examined is the following picture:
The prerequisites for a large-scale conflict exist and are more serious than at any moment since 1962. The deterrence mechanisms have degraded systemically and simultaneously. The economic interests of a number of influential actors point not toward the conclusion of conflicts but toward their maintenance in a managed state.
None of the major parties is an unambiguous victim or an unambiguous aggressor — each is simultaneously the subject of its own decisions and the object of systemic pressures that it partly created, partly inherited, and partly cannot control.
Nuclear deterrence remains a real factor — but not an absolute guarantee, since its functionality depends on conditions that are today systematically deteriorating.
The only question that matters from the standpoint of preventing catastrophe — the question that both propaganda systems are carefully blocking — is: whose interests lie in the continuation of the conflict and whose interests lie in its conclusion?
Answering it requires neither hatred nor naivety. It requires precisely what the headline of this article speaks of: not equidistance from all positions — but the equal application of logic to all positions.
This article ends. Your analysis does not. The next news item you read after closing this page will already be a test: did you apply the equal standard? Did you ask cui bono? Did you find your closed answer — and doubt it? Or did you return to the familiar narrative, because it is warmer and simpler there? The choice is yours. It always was.
This article deliberately contains no political recommendations. Its sole purpose is to provide the reader with analytical tools for independent reflection on what is happening.
© lesnoy, May 27, 2026. Translation © lesnoy
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